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Abstract 
Applying the theoretical framework of NGO-government relations, this article shall look into 
the Government of Turkey (GoT)’s critical role in shaping humanitarian space in Southeast Turkey, 
which increasingly gained a reputation as the hinterland of cross-border response to Northern Syria 
and Syrian refugee response in Turkey. The year of 2015 proved a turning point for change in the 
Turkish government’s stance towards humanitarian activities, stemming from proliferating security 
concerns over the spill-overs of the Syrian Civil War. Meanwhile, Turkey’s political stance has 
evolved into playing a more active role through military involvement, which has also constituted the 
basis for widening controls and pressure over non-governmental organisations (NGOs) sending 
cross-border aid deliveries from Turkey to Syria. As the case study, I shall explore the government’s 
management of its Southeast border with Syria to restrict NGO operations while reinforcing the 
operational space of several favoured organisations. Overall, this article argues that GoT used its 
certain leverage guaranteed through institutional conditioning factors, and its agency on not adopting 
select border management practices introduced through EU externalisation, to regulate and hamper 
humanitarian aid flow over its Southeast border with Syria to be in consistence with its political 
stance towards the Syrian Civil War, which overall led to shrinking humanitarian space in the Turkey 
context. 
Key words: NGO-government relations, NGO, humanitarian space, Southeast Turkey, Northwest 
Syria, refugee, border management. 
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Turkey has been ranking as the world’s top refugee-hosting country with 
around three and a half million Syrian refugees for a few years now1. For a country 
which adopted the first-ever migration management legislation in 2013 but still 
lacks a centralised system of migration management (Ustubici, 2018), GoT has 
manifested strong national ownership over Syrian refugee response. Yet, unable to 
respond to the needs of the fast-growing refugee population, it has condoned 
national and foreign NGOs to bolster presence and to extend activities mostly for 
financial considerations (Mackreath and Sagnic, 2017). This provided NGOs with 
easy access to Syrian refugees living outside refugee camps where the government 
did not have much control over (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 2017). However, as 
observed during the response to 1999 earthquake, GoT approaches to (especially 
foreign) NGOs with suspicion and fear (Jalali, 2002; Ozerdem and Jacoby, 2006). 
The year of 2015 proved a turning point of NGO-government relations as security 
concerns ‘including renewed tensions over the Kurdish conflict, instability spilling 
over from neighbouring Syria, a series of terrorist attacks by ISIL’ (TUSEV, 
2018:6) intensified in Southeast Turkey. Increasing attention over Southeast Turkey 
due to the above-mentioned security concerns complicated the management of 
NGOs which considered Southeast Turkey ‘the safe ‘hinterland’ (…) delivering aid 
into Syria’ (Hoffman and Samuk, 2016:7).   
The main argument of this article is to discuss that GoT used its certain 
leverage guaranteed through institutional conditioning factors, and its agency on 
not adopting select border management practices introduced through EU 
externalisation, to regulate and hamper humanitarian aid flow over its Southeast 
border with Syria to be in consistence with its political stance towards the Syrian 
Civil War, which led to shrinking humanitarian space in the Turkey context. A brief 
introduction in this section is followed by the analysis of the relevant literature on 
NGO-government relations focusing on legislative frameworks and political 
context. Thirdly, legislative frameworks and the political context will be discussed 
in the case of Turkey, as both of which were used to crack down on NGOs. The 
following section will provide an analysis of GoT’s agency in shaping the EU 
externalisation through border management practices and the ways the latter was 
used to restrict humanitarian space in Turkey.  
 
 
                                                 
1  According to the latest data from the Directorate General of Migration Management, as of 13 June 2019 
the number of Syrian refugees registered under Temporary Protection in Turkey is 3.613.644 (Accessed 
from: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik on 28 June 2019).  
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2. Theoretical considerations: NGO-government relations 
Structural limitations and mutual distrust preventing the establishment of 
productive relations lie behind ‘reluctant partners(ship)’ between government and 
NGOs (Bebbington and Farrington, 1993 cited in Hulme and Edwards, 1996:5). As 
Clark (1992:152) argues ‘(NGOs) have three choices: They can oppose the state, 
complement it, or reform it -but they cannot ignore it.’ Yet, in the emergency 
response context, the hosting government has the primary responsibility in the 
facilitation and governance of NGO operations. In this article ‘hosting state’ refers 
to a country affected by a disaster or humanitarian emergency resulting in swelling 
presence of local and foreign to support emergency response for those in need while 
NGO are non-profit, non-governmental service providers of basic services mainly 
with humanitarian purposes (Teamey, 2007). The UN Resolution 46/182 (1991) 
and Humanitarian Charter (2011) grant the primary authority on managing 
assistance to the affected state and require NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance 
only after being invited or permitted by affected country governments. However, as 
Davis (2006) exemplifies the process of developing the Sphere Handbook, one of 
the most crucial documents for humanitarian work, humanitarian community have 
not engaged affected country governments in many of the humanitarian-related 
decision-making processes. Lack of representation of affected country governments 
in high-level humanitarian decision-making processes unravels the reasons behind 
the absence of engagement and cooperation between governments and NGOs 
(Harvey, 2009).  
Much of the current literature pays particular attention to country-specific 
nature of NGO-government relations (Haque, 2002; Bratton, 1989). In this regard, 
Bennett (1997) argues for NGOs to develop country-specific initiatives which 
naturally lead to conducive relations with hosting governments. In parallel, Clark 
(1991; 1992) advocates for NGOs to acknowledge political, economic and cultural 
characteristics of the country as one of the building bricks of the relationship with 
the government. In the case of Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders, 
known as MSF) it has presented as creating a significance to formulate operations 
in different emergency contexts per distinctive characteristics of each situation 
(Magone, Neuman and Weissman, 2011).  
There are several institutional conditioning factors shaping this country 
specific context for NGOs and governments to operate (Teamey, 2007). Firstly, the 
studies widely acknowledge national legislation as one of the most preeminent 
determinants of NGO-government relation. Legislative frameworks provide 
governments with a certain gravity on constructing the operational space of NGOs 
(Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2016). In his detailed analysis, Batley (2006) claims that 
it allows governments to define the limits of NGO operations and provides the 
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ground for productive NGO operations. Sood (2000) asserts that enforcing 
legislation on NGOs is beneficial for both sides as it allows NGOs to stay 
accountable to the people they are serving. More to the positive use of legislation, 
Wamai (2004) analyses the role of legislation on building a joint and 
complementary response in two different contexts, Finland and Kenya. Yet, Ullah 
et al (2006) demonstrates that in Bangladeshi context the legislative frameworks 
have hyperbolically been used to frame practical interaction with NGOs. In this 
regard, this change highly depends on the extent that NGOs take in part in the 
formulation of national legislation. Yet, a principal amount of studies reveals the 
lack of engagement with NGOs in the development of NGO legislations (Moran, 
2006; Adin-Yaonsah and Harrell-Band, 1997) It is further argued that in the last 
twenty years almost a quarter of the low and middle-income states have put laws 
into use which restrict their operations and the flow of funds from the international 
donors (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2016).  
I have identified three types of legislation from the literature: suppressive, 
promotive and subjective (Mayhew, 2005; Batley, 2006). Due to the scope of this 
article, I shall only look into the literature on the suppressive and subjective 
legislation. Concerning suppressive legislation, Batley (2006) has found out that the 
government, on the one hand, adopts restrictive legal frameworks while at the same 
time seeking to cooperate with NGOs without applying these laws, which creates 
ambiguity especially for NGOs. Dupuy, Ron and Prakash (2016) assert that the 
governments are more likely to adopt suppressive NGO legislations when they 
claim victory in the aggressive elective competitions. On the other hand, it is also 
argued that where the government itself provides services, it can seek to prevent 
competition and suppress NGO operations by employing legislation (Batley, 2006). 
In other cases, restrictive legislation bolsters the government’s ability to lead NGO 
operations to the needed sectors, ruling out their capability or preferences (Moore 
and Moyo, 2016; Harvey, 2009). It can have extreme consequences for NGO 
operations, in particular by leading to delays in implementing the activities (Jelinek, 
2006). Subjective criteria in the legislative frameworks gives ground for the 
government to apply in accordance with its political interests (Teamey, 2007). 
Mayhew (2005:746) found out in all three of their study countries, NGO legislations 
include subjective criteria for dissolution, containing open phrases such as ‘national 
security’ in Cambodia, ‘national interest’ in Nepal, ‘national solidarity’ in Vietnam. 
Moore and Moyo (2016:6) argues that in Zimbabwe the ‘vague grounds’ in the law 
gives power to the relevant ministry to stop the operations of NGOs on the grounds 
of national interest. 
Secondly, the literature acknowledges that political regime of a hosting state 
constructs a significant variable for NGO-government relations (Sen, 1999). 
National political context mirrors convoluted nature of societies that governments 
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represent (Fisher, 1998). Hosting governments inherently seek to maintain authority 
over NGOs and other actors, which reveals the main concern to be the pursuit of 
national interest (Hulme and Edwards, 1996; Owen, 2000). Identifying themselves 
‘as the sole representative of people’s voice’ (Behera, 2002:12), it is argued that the 
governments are likely to oppose any connection between NGOs and the public 
without their involvement (Teamey, 2007). Pereira (2005) argues that in some 
instances this may lead to government’s discharging NGOs from their political role 
and recognising them only as service-providers. Dupuy, Ron and Prakash (2016) 
highlight that there are specific political circumstances in which the government is 
more courageous to renounce NGO operations at the cost of losing the foreign 
funding. The aftermath of competitive elections is one of them as it is when a 
government’s power is assured (Ismail and Kamat, 2018). Bratton (1989) argues 
that where NGOs engage in cross-border activities, the governments are more likely 
to keep them under scrutiny, as I shall extrapolate in the Turkey context in the 
following section. However, combining neoliberalism with authoritarianism, Ismail 
and Kamat (2018) derive that authoritarian governments cooperate with certain 
NGOs which share their right-wing policies, which creates a group of favoured, 
state-affiliated NGOs, as in Turkey.  
3. The determinants of NGO-government relations in Turkey 
The literature reveals increasing enthusiasm among developing countries to 
take control of the responses to humanitarian crisis. In similar settings to Turkey, 
the governments have been showing ‘growing willingness and ability to respond to 
disasters without external assistance’ thanks to increasing wealth (Harvey, 2009:1). As a 
wealthy developing country, the Turkish government has manifested strong 
national ownership over the humanitarian response. Yet, unable to respond to the 
needs of the fast-growing refugee population, it has condoned national and foreign 
NGOs to bolster presence and to extend activities mostly for financial 
considerations (Mackreath and Sagnic, 2017). This provided NGOs with easy 
access to Syrian refugees living outside the refugee camps where the government 
did not have much control over (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 2017). It has 
encouraged, for example, Syrian people themselves to set up Turkey-based NGOs 
to join the humanitarian response, which Hoffman and Samuk (2016) recognises as 
a very constructive move of GoT. 
However, GoT approaches to (especially foreign) NGOs with suspicion and 
fear, as observed during the response to 1999 earthquake (Jalali, 2002; Ozerdem 
and Jacoby, 2006). Turkey has developed a well-structured tradition of devlet baba 
(paternal state), which neither engages nor bolsters civil society (Kalaycioglu, 
2001). Moreover, hierarchy has been built around an understanding of ‘the strong 
state and weak civil society’ (Heper, 1985:16). Prior research substantiates the 
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belief, it was only in the 1980s when NGOs have become self-reliant (TUSEV, 
2017). Most importantly, the reform process for the EU Accession has eventually 
become the cornerstone for a more productive NGO-government relationship 
(ibid). After officially gaining EU candidate country status in 2003, GoT has 
improved a few of the relevant legislation as part of the process between 2004 and 
2008 and involved NGOs in the decision-making process, albeit limitedly (TUSEV, 
2018). Losing interest in the Accession after 2008, the focus moved away from the 
reforms (ibid). Despite all the improvements, the country is still ruled by the 1982 
Constitution, put into force by the military regime and thus, limited in many 
respects. 
There are four legislative frameworks constructing the operating environment 
of NGOs in the national level, which are Law No. 4721 Turkish Civil Code, Law No. 
5253 on Associations, Law No. 4817 on Work Permits and Regulation on Work 
Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection. One of the means that GoT 
utilises to regulate and restrict the operations of NGOs is through ambiguous criteria 
which includes phrases of contrary to the laws and ethics, public morality, and 
public security and allows an unlimited breadth of subjective practices to the 
government offices (Ozerdem and Jacoby, 2006). Article 56 of the Turkish Civil 
Code states that ‘[n]o association may be formed for an object contrary to the laws 
and ethics’ (italic by me). The same phrase is included in the conditions for 
dissolution in the Article 89 of the same law. Regarding the implementation, TUSEV 
(2017) claims that using that, the Ministry of Interior did not register several NGOs 
which submitted the same office address in their registration criteria. 
Furthermore, legislation grants absolute prudence to the relevant ministries 
over foreign NGOs particularly (Ayata and Karan, 2015). Article 5 of the Law on 
Associations states that foreign NGOs can open offices and operate in Turkey ‘upon 
(the) permission of Ministry of Interior and consult of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. 
Practice proves that ministries arbitrarily used this phrase in accordance with the 
nature of political dialogue with the origin country of NGOs), in several cases 
reaching to prolonged processes with no feedback (ibid). It is claimed that 
dissolution process is even more non-transparent than the registration (TUSEV, 
2016). Article 89 of the Turkish Civil Code states that the court shall regulate the 
closure of an NGO (TUSEV, 2018) although in practice the Ministry of Interior, 
without obtaining a court order, closed down or confined the activities of several 
foreign NGOs whose actions are claimed to be a threat to public security (TUSEV, 
2018). Lastly on restrictions through legislative frameworks, Article 14 of the Law 
on Work Permits gives an arbitrary power to the Ministry of Interior for the 
rejection of work permit applications of foreigners through sections ‘(a) The 
Ministry of Interior expresses a negative opinion’ and ‘(e) Working of the foreigner 
forms a threat for national security, public order, general security, public interest, 
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general ethics and general health’ (see also, TUSEV, 2018). This also was also used 
to restrict the capabilities of NGOs which depend on Syrian employees especially 
due to language skills and expertise of the Syrian context (TUSEV, 2017).   
Regarding political context shaping NGO-government relations in Turkey, it 
is acknowledged in the literature that GoT approaches to (especially foreign) NGOs 
with suspicion and fear, as observed during the response to 1999 earthquake (Jalali, 
2002; Ozerdem and Jacoby, 2006). Although allowing to bolster presence and to 
extend activities mostly for financial considerations at the beginning of Syrian 
refugee response, the landscape of the relations has changed in 2015 when the 
country has gone through a political turmoil due to the spill-overs from the Syrian 
Civil War and the political fluctuations in the national level (TUSEV, 2018). GoT 
has become more dominating over NGOs but the suppression reached its peak with 
the State of Emergency (SoE) following the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016 
for GoT collected all three branches of government through continuous presidential 
decrees for two years from 21 July 2016 to 18 July 2018 (ICG, 2018). It is widely 
argued that the SoE had the most atrocious effect on shrinking humanitarian space 
and widening the uncertainties for NGOs (ICG, 2018). GoT increased arbitrary 
practices to crack down on NGOs. For example, several Syrian employees of NGOs 
which were closed down were deported to Syria or another country thanks to the 
changes on the changes on legislation done through presidential decrees 
(Zoeteweij-Turhan, 2018).  
Still before SoE, the coordination of NGO operations in the provincial level 
were also puzzling for NGOs, requiring establishing communication channels with 
the following actors (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 2017). The Governor is appointed 
by the President and gave NGOs’ operation permits in the provincial level. The 
Mayor is the representative of the elected political party in the province. Although 
NGOs do not have to build any official relations, collaboration with the Mayor’s 
Office eases access (ibid). In this regard, practices and restrictions were different 
among provinces. (Hoffman and Sagnic, 2016). In the provinces where one of the 
opposition parties, CHP or HDP, holds power, ‘there is little or no dialogue between 
state authorities and local elected officials’ (ICG, 2018:10). Party politics has a 
significant impact in the provincial level (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 2017), which 
forces NGOs to accommodate different requests from opposite parties. For 
instance, in Gaziantep where the mayor is from the ruling party AKP and relations 
between the Governor and the Mayor is productive, both the coordination with 
NGOs and refugee response are more systematic and the approach was 
collaborative (ibid). On the other hand, in Kurdish-populated Diyarbakir where the 
Mayor is from the pro-Kurdish HDP, NGO operations were under scrutiny and 
viewed with suspicion (Bianet, 2017).  
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Lastly I will scrutinize governmental institutions and state-affiliated 
organisations affecting humanitarian space in Turkey. Afet ve Acil Yönetim 
Başkanlığı (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority, AFAD) is disaster 
management body operating under the Ministry of Interior, appointed as the main 
coordination office on Syrian refugee response (Demirhan and Aslan, 2015). It 
facilitates coordination of NGOs in alliance with the Governor in the provincial 
level. Reporting directly to the Prime Minister casts AFAD a political role. In fact, 
it is widely argued that it ‘acts as the face of the state in humanitarian assistance’ 
(Mackreath and Sagnic, 2017:52). Directorate-General for Migration Management 
(DGMM) is the migration management body under the Ministry of Interior and 
manages the registration of Syrian refugees, which is a practice taken from the 
responsibility of UNHCR when the agency was founded in 2013 (Fine, 2018). 
DGMM has a lower level of presence in the provincial level in terms of the 
management of NGO operations, compared to AFAD. However, in some provinces, 
such as Adana, which is a city in the Mediterranean region and whose Mayor is 
from the main opposition party CHP, DGMM has been the main actor supervising 
the coordination with NGOs (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 2017). Despite the political 
bonds, neither AFAD nor DGMM are experts in migration management, which 
resulted in a constant change of the practices. AFAD was responsible for the 
disaster management but had no previous experience particularly in migration 
management. DGMM has been established only recently; therefore, been 
strengthening its organisational structure in the meantime (Mackreath and Sagnic, 
2017). 
It is widely acknowledged by NGOs that the government is ‘cooperating only 
with those who are ideologically aligned with it, or even creating its own (NGOs)’ 
(ibid: 3), which was also mentioned in the latest report of the European Commission 
(EC, 2018). For instance, Insani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 
IHH) is known to be ‘a staunch supporter of the government’ (ICG, 2013:38) and 
is one of the very few Turkish NGOs accessing to Syrian refugee camps in Turkey 
as well as in Northern Syria to where NGOs have restricted access (Fine, 2018). 
Furthermore, Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has been given a wide authority in the 
response from cross-border movement of aid from Turkey to Syria, to the access to 
the refugee camps as well as to supporting out-of-camp refugees (Aras and Akpinar, 
2015; SC, 2016). Despite no official standing other than tax exemption status of 
both organizations2, Tabak (2015) relates this affinity to the AKP government’s 
                                                 
2  The information is obtained from the list of the associations and foundations with tax exempt status on 
the website of the Revenue Administration, which is in Turkish. IHH has got the status on 4 April 2011, 
which is a month later from the start of the Syrian Civil War and approximately when the flow of Syrian 
refugees has started though only in small numbers. The list is available on:   
http://www.gib.gov.tr/yardim-ve-kaynaklar/yararli-bilgiler/vergi-muafiyeti-taninan-vakiflarin-listesi   
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reconsolidation of Islamic initiatives in the immediate aftermath of taking the 
office. IHH is being funded mostly by Turkish conservative businesses and 
international Muslim organisations (ICG, 2013; IHH, 2017; Binder, 2014). Both 
IHH and TRC have been doing activities in Muslim communities like Somalia and 
Yemen in partnership with Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı 
(Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, TIKA) (TIKA, 2018a; 2018b, 
2016; see also Tabak, 2015). TRC has also got the biggest portion of the funds from 
the EU-Turkey Deal in order to initiate a social safety net (called ESSN) for Syrian 
refugees who live out of the camps with the oversight of World Food Programme 
(WFP, 2017).  
The issue of being favoured by the government or not has also disturbed the 
relations among NGOs. Mackreath and Sagnic (2017) discloses, for instance, that 
when they invited NGOs to take in the focus group meeting for their study and 
announced that it was in Mazlum-Der’s office. Being it an organisation whose 
management has been taken over by the government after raising criticism on the 
consequences of the SoE (IHD, 2017), some NGOs rejected to join the meeting due 
to ‘[t]he fear of “those”, or of showing cooperation with (NGOs) that are not 
favoured by Erdogan and the government’ (Mackreath and Sagnic,2017:51).  
4. Case study: Shrinking humanitarian space in Turkey, with a 
specific focus on border management in southeast Turkey 
Turkey has no specialised law to govern border management (Yildiz, 2016). 
In fact, it has given importance to migration management in general, border 
management in particular, only with the EU accession process (Ustubici, 2018). 
Thus, GoT’s border management practice has been widely affected by the 
externalisation of the EU migration management policies and practices (Icduygu 
and Ustubici, 2014). In this regard, it has appreciated ‘the increasingly humanitarian 
role that border officials have taken on’ in the EU context and in fact applied it into 
its own border management strategy (Fine, 2018:52). GoT has used this 
humanitarianism frame even when it has closed the borders but accommodated 
Syrian people in the camps built in the Northern Syria. I acknowledge this practice 
to reflect EU’s humanitarian border management which focuses on saving lives 
before reaching to EU territories.  
However, notwithstanding the impact of the EU externalisation, GoT has 
shifted its border management priorities towards ‘the physical protection of the 
borders and national security, rather than the management of these borders in line 
with EU demands’ due to the increasing security threats and national political 
changes (Yildiz, 2016:114). This has complicated the work of NGOs based in 
Turkey which have been sending cross-border aid deliveries from Turkey to Syria. 
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Most of these NGOs have either small number of staff inside Syria or been 
operating through Syrian partner organisations which have presence inside Syria, 
but they keep the office in Southeast Turkey to ensure a continuing flow of 
humanitarian aid via Turkey (Mantabone, 2017). While together with open border 
policy for refugees, GoT demonstrated flexibility to cross-border movements of 
NGOs at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War (ibid:189), this has evolved into a 
more restrictive approach with the increasing security threats from the late 2015 
(D’Alema, 2017). Therefore, I argue in this section that GoT’s confining border 
management practices in general have ‘restricted humanitarian access [of NGOs] 
to Syria’ and of the refugees to Turkey (USDS, 2017:3; Slim and Trombetta, 2014). 
4.1. Border Management and the EU Externalisation  
Despite arguing that Turkey is not a pawn of the EU in the externalisation 
process, the current literature lacks a focus on the agency of GoT in shaping border 
management practices in accordance with their interests (Ustubici, 2018; Fine, 
2018). With the aim of filling this gap, I highlight that Turkey has always been an 
active agent, beginning from the development of these policies. Okyay (2017:830) 
argues that ‘changing power configurations, and newly arising threats emanating 
from the neighbouring conflict’ has forced the government to draw away from the 
EU practices.  
Togral (2013:170) defines the term externalisation as ‘the utilisation of 
outward-directed practices with the aim of preventing the arrival of ‘unwanted’ 
migrants and/or facilitating their expulsion before they gain ‘secure’ status’ within 
the European territories. In particular for Turkey the externalisation practices have 
been forced even before the country had gained an official candidate status in 2003. 
The literature vastly agrees upon that Turkey’s role became tangible in the 
European migration system from the 1990s due to its position as a transit country 
(Ustubici, 2018:50; Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012). The EU utilised the label transit 
country to create the justification for enforcing certain migration management 
methods on the third countries like Turkey. These are mainly compromised of visa 
limitations, border controls and most importantly, readmission agreements 
(Ustubici, 2018).  
In the process of EU externalisation, Turkey has primarily introduced visa 
requirements to some of the countries which the EU has on the negative visa list 
while removing for some on the same list (Togral, 2013). This resulted from GoT’s 
intention to cooperate with these countries in several means and thanks to zero 
problems with neighbours foreign policy at the time (ibid). Second, the first 
legislation on migration management has been put in force only in 2013, which is 
Law No 6435 on Foreigners and International Protection (Yildiz, 2016). 
Particularly to manage the Syrian refugees, Temporary Protection Regulation have 
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been adopted in 2014. In addition to the belatedness, Fine points at GoT’s aim to 
formulate its law around European model (Fine, 2018). Overall, it proves that GoT 
has shaped pressures from the EU externalisation in accordance with its policies 
and politics, as during the adoption of migration legislation, which corresponded to 
the time when the country had to accommodate huge influx of Syrian refugees. 
Thirdly, the biggest part of the EU externalisation has been implemented through 
readmission agreements (Togral, 2013). Although Turkey and Greece had 
previously signed several bilateral agreements, ‘realpolitik has urged both parties 
to cooperate following the refugee crisis’, leading to the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal 
(Yildiz, 2016:111). Turkey’s gaining the position as third safe country was subject 
to the removal of the geographical limitation which results from not ratifying the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although GoT did not remove 
the limitation and continued not recognizing non-Europeans as refugees, the EU-
Turkey Deal has still come in force in 2016 (Sari and Dincer, 2017). Fine asserts 
that the position has still been given as ‘a performative function of the 2013 LFIP 
law’ (Fine, 2018:20-1).  
Lastly and most importantly, GoT has strengthened the management of its 
land and sea borders as the intrinsic condition of the EU Accession (Lanfermann, 
2014). It has firstly passed the strategy papers and national action plans, and set up 
the Bureau for Integrated Border Management (IBM) in 2008 (Lanfermann, 2014). 
Moreover, the policy has evolved into reinforcing security along its South-east 
borders by way of technological improvements (Yildiz, 2016). Fine (2018:25) 
argues for integration of the EU’s IBM to be read as ‘indicative of the successful 
steer from EU agencies’. Still, Turkey does have neither a central establishment nor 
a proper legislation on border management (Yildiz, 2016). Different governmental 
and military bodies hold different roles while the Ministry of Interior supervises the 
whole system (Sert, 2013). The National Police Force is responsible of governing 
entry and exit of persons, and the Ministry of Customs and Trade is managing the 
movement of the vehicles and goods, including cross-border aid deliveries of NGOs 
from Turkey to Syria (ibid). Isleyen (2018) further asserts that DGMM has taken 
over some responsibilities from the police to manage persons’ movement. 
While improvements linked to the EU externalisation have mainly been 
applied on the Turkey-Greece border, the management of the Southeast border have 
been modified in accordance with political considerations (Korkut, 2016), which 
resulted from increasing security concerns in Southeast border (Yildiz, 2016). GoT 
considers Kurdish forces inside Syria to have close ties with the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK), which is officially recognised as terrorist organisation in Turkey and 
is one of the biggest security concerns since the 1980s (Mantabone, 2017). Afraid 
of being spread to Turkey’s Kurds, the government aimed to control the Kurdish 
forces in Syria getting closer to the border (Hoffman and Samuk, 2016). For 
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instance, despite open border policy Korkut argues (2016:15) that Turkey was put 
into ‘a dilemma between security considerations and humanitarianism’ with the 
influx of Syrian-Kurdish refugees from Kobane in the late 2014 due to the 
previously mentioned concern. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee 
influx, IBM has been interrupted and the government has deployed a large number 
of military personnel in its South-east border (Yesiltas, 2015). Furthermore, it has 
recently built a wall on its border with Syria, apart from introducing technological 
improvements (ibid). In fact, this practice is quite contrary to the EU policies which 
do ‘not take the form of walls, yet (...) functions to include and exclude’ with a 
humanitarian stance (Fine, 2018:98).  
4.2. Restrictions over NGO operations through border management 
practices 
In the literature review section, it has been highlighted that the government’s 
usage of national legislation to restrict NGO operations highly depends upon the 
extent that NGOs participate in developing them. In the case of Turkey, NGOs were 
partly included in improving the legislations in the process of EU externalisation. 
Besides, their involvement has often been defined and restricted in accordance with 
the subjective criteria in the legislation and with the political situation of the time, 
as discussed in the previous section. From the law-making process to the border 
management, NGOs have faced certain limitations, such as lack of NGOs 
engagement in border crossing process of Syrian refugees as well as restrictions on 
the cross-border aid (Fine, 2018; Ustubici, 2018). With the involvement of different 
actors in the war, especially starting from 2013 it has become harder to deliver 
‘cross-line aid’ which refers to the transmission of deliveries from relatively secure 
government-held areas to the opposition areas (The Guardian, 2016). The positive 
discussions around the necessity of cross-border aid in the UN Security Council 
have led NGOs which have operations in the Northern Syria to rather organise 
cross-border aid deliveries from Turkey (Slim and Trombetta, 2014; ICG, 2013).  
Based on the interviews with several NGO staff ICG (2013) reports that 
NGOs have faced restrictions from the beginning of this transition from cross-line 
inside Syria to cross-border aid from Turkey to Syria. However, it is widely argued 
that GoT had a flexible approach over cross-border deliveries at the beginning, till 
2015 (Mantabone, 2017). One of the restrictions was applied through customs 
check. A staff member of a foreign NGO operating from Turkey underlines that the 
Turkish officials have been checking all the items at the border, even if purchased 
inside Turkey (ICG, 2013). Kirisci (2014:39) links this to GoT’s distrust over NGOs 
and preference to keep 'INGOs away from a volatile region’ like the South-east 
Turkey. Moreover, as Slim and Trombetta (2014:46) rightfully assert, GoT ‘was 
consistently reluctant to register international NGOs formally to work cross-border 
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in case this (...) could work against their interests in any future conflict in the 
region’. With the intensification of the battle in Aleppo in February 2016, around 
70,000 Syrian people fled to the border with Turkey (Betts, Ali and Memisoglu, 
2017). While they were waiting to be admitted into the country, the government has 
decided not to open its borders, but to accommodate them in the camps that will be 
built on the other side of the border, in the Northern Syria (ibid). The GoT has itself 
been both funding several NGOs and directing NGOs’ funds to contribute on this 
plan through AFAD, TRC or state-affiliated NGOs such as IHH. Through the 
responses from a field research with NGOs Hoffman and Samuk (2016) identified 
that AFAD had been approaching and asking NGOs to provide the necessary items 
for the establishment of the new camps in the Northern Syria. 
IHH has been operating in Syria from the beginning  of the war (Dinçer et al, 
2013). Focusing on Jarablus, which is a district in the North-East of Aleppo by the 
Turkey-Syria border and has been occupied by the Turkish-led military forces since 
2016 based on the fear of the Kurdish autonomy (FT, 2018), Haid (2017:2) 
highlights that the Turkish military does not let local Syrian and foreign NGOs 
operate in Jarablus while ‘channel(ling) their support through approved 
organizations’. Newspaper articles reported several examples, such as that AFAD 
built camps (Daily Sabah, 2018) and IHH sent trucks of humanitarian aid from 
Turkey (AA, 2017b). Furthermore, the most important aspect of IHH operations is, 
as Ferris and Kirisci (2015) report, their collaboration with TRC over the delivery 
of NGOs’ cross-border aid from Turkey, in addition to their own involvement in 
cross-border activities in Northern Syria. A system named zero point delivery has 
been developed, granting TRC responsibility to ‘hand over all aid at a zero point at 
the Turkish-Syrian border to local NGOs or local councils’ (Binder, 2014:3), 
mentioned in TRC (2018)’s own publications as well. While some NGOs appreciate 
TRC’s support, many ‘others voice concern that there is no control over where the 
goods go once they are handed over.’ (Binder, 2014:3; Aras and Akpınar, 2015).   
In this regard, I have a personal experience from my time working for foreign 
NGOs in Gaziantep between late 2014 to August 2017. I personally dealt with such 
calls while working for a NGO based in Gaziantep. In the first instance which took 
place around mid-2016, I attended a meeting with the head of AFAD Kilis Branch 
as the translator between my colleague and AFAD official. Although I was not 
involved in the process, through the interaction with my colleague before the 
meeting I learnt that the NGO donated tents and some other items for AFAD to use 
in the camps built in the Northern Syria through a Memorandum of Understanding 
which clearly started the return of unused items to the NGO. However, although 
AFAD did not use all the items and the NGO was asking the unused items back to 
use for their own purposes, AFAD refused by claiming that the tents were safe in 
their warehouses and they were planning to use them for another camp which would 
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be built in the same area soon. This instance shows that AFAD maintained a 
hierarchical relationship with NGOs which are left forced to remain silent for not 
obeying the agreement only in order to maintain a good relationship with AFAD. 
In the second instance, in early 2017 AFAD approached to the NGO’s liaison 
officer via unofficial means, either a phone call or a personal conversation 
following the meeting which was held for another purpose, by requesting the NGO 
to raise funds to do the gravelling work for a camp in Northern Syria. I was part of 
the Program Development Unit, responsible of writing project proposals and raising 
funds; therefore the colleagues has approached to our department asking to deal 
with this. Although the first call came from AFAD, a concept note detailing the 
required budget was submitted by IHH. The significance of this case is that although 
we didn’t have any spare funds at the time, we had raised funds in the headquarters 
level due to the fear that refusing the request could result in worsening the relations 
with AFAD. Secondly, as it widely argued in the literature (Mackreath and Sagnic, 
2017) and as I personally observed through my professional experience AFAD had 
a close working relationship with IHH; in fact, used IHH as one of the main 
implementing partners. Through these practices, GoT has been securing the 
operational space of its own offices and state-affiliated NGOs while humanitarian 
space has been shrinking especially for NGOs which did not want to collaborate 
with state-affiliated NGOs or attempted to work in the areas where GoT had 
security-related concerns, such as Kurdish populated areas of northern Syria 
(Hoffman and Samuk, 2016).  
Finally, I shall conclude this section by summarising some of the events 
resulting from shrinking humanitarian space in the Turkey context. Since foreign 
NGOs had to obtain permits to have an office in Turkey even if they are only 
working cross-border, the subjective criteria on the legislation and political context 
in general, the State of Emergency in particular, has given an arbitrary power to 
GoT, which used it to crack down on national as well as foreign NGOs on national 
security grounds (TUSEV, 2018). In 2017 the operation permit of Mercy Corps, 
which had operations in Turkey as well as cross-border in northern Syria with a 
large portfolio (Mellen and Lynch, 2017), was cancelled for being a threat to 
national security. Furthermore, in the same year several foreign NGOs’ permits 
were not renewed; therefore, were forced to end operations in Turkey and via 
Turkey (Bianet, 2017). The rest of NGOs faced investigation of their registrations 
and of Syrian and foreign employees’ work permits (Aid Insights, 2018). The police 
used arbitrary powers and unusual practices in this process, such as checking the 
work permits of foreigners sitting at Starbucks in one of the shopping malls in 
Gaziantep (Mellen and Lynch, 2017). Moreover, some of the Syrian refugees who 
used to work for closed-down foreign NGOs were deported to Syria or another 
country due to ‘amendments to the Turkish Law on Foreigners and International 
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Protection made by a presidential decree in October 2016’ (Zoeteweij-Turhan, 
2018:56).   
5. Conclusion 
Applying the theoretical framework of NGO-government relations, this 
article shall look into GoT’s critical role in shaping humanitarian space in Southeast 
Turkey, which increasingly gained a reputation as the hinterland of cross-border 
response to Northern Syria and Syrian refugee response in Turkey. Overall, I have 
argued that GoT used its certain leverage guaranteed through institutional 
conditioning factors, and its agency on not adopting select border management 
practices introduced through EU externalisation, to regulate and hamper 
humanitarian aid flow over its Southeast border with Syria to be in consistence with 
its political stance towards the Syrian Civil War, which overall led to shrinking 
humanitarian space in the Turkey context.  
In the literature review section, I looked into two of institutional conditioning 
factors, legislation and political context, embodying country-specific NGO-
government relations. Discussion of these factors emblazed the case of Turkey, 
where the government was granted a certain leverage over NGOs thanks to the 
subjective criteria in the legislation, and political context structured around national 
security considerations. Thus, by these means it has established a hierarchical 
relation with NGOs. Moreover, I also showed that GoT has maintained a group of 
favoured NGOs which share its right-wing policies and used these state-affiliated 
NGOs as its implementing partners in order to diminish the dependency on 
unfavoured NGOs. Moreover, unofficially enforcing the partnership with the state-
affiliated NGOs has been used to control and direct NGO operations in accordance 
with the political considerations. 
As the case study, I looked into how the government’s management of its 
South-east border with Syria was used to restrict NGO operations while reinforcing 
humanitarian space of favoured organisations. As discussed in the literature review 
section governments use two institutional conditioning factors, legislation and 
political context, to grant control over NGO operations. Regarding border 
management practices in Southeast Turkey, I discussed that GoT used the first 
factor as part of the EU externalisation through which improvements over 
legislation were done. Yet, it showed agency in adopting the EU policies in 
accordance with its political considerations. Notwithstanding the impact of the EU 
externalisation, GoT has shifted its border management priorities towards ‘the 
physical protection of the borders and national security’ as the spill-overs of the 
Syrian Civil War have been perceived as national security threats (Yildiz, 
2016:114).  
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This has complicated the work of NGOs, especially which are based in Turkey 
and have been sending cross-border aid deliveries from Turkey to Syria. The 
increasing security incidents inside Syria and limitations of cross-line deliveries 
from the regime-held areas to the opposition areas in the Northern Syria have led 
many NGOs to move their offices into Turkey and shift to cross-border operations. 
As the security concerns over the spillovers of the Syrian Civil War have increased 
and resulted in the evolution of Turkey’s political stance into playing more active 
role through military involvement, the Turkish government has increasingly put 
pressure on NGOs. Through AFAD known ‘as the face of the state in humanitarian 
assistance’ (Mackreath and Sagnic, 2017:52) the enforcement of the role of the 
state-affiliated organisations, of TRC and IHH in particular, has been utilised by 
GoT to restrict the operational space of humanitarian organisations doing cross-
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Türkiye’de daralan insani yardım alanı: Türkiye hükümeti’nin insani yardım 
alanında çalışan STK’ların operasyonlarını şekillendirmede gösterdiği 
eylemlilik 
 
Bu çalışma, STK-hükümet ilişkileri teorik çerçevesini kullanarak Kuzey Suriye’ye sınır-ötesi 
yardımların ve Türkiye içerisindeki en yüksek mülteci nüfusunun odaklandığı yer olarak Suriye mülteci 
desteğinin sağlandığı içbölge statüsüyle ün salan Türkiye’nin güneydoğu bölgesinde Türkiye Hükümeti’nin 
insani yardım alanını şekillendirmedeki kritik rolünü sorgulamaktadır. 2015 yılı, Suriye İç Savaşı’nın 
etkileri dolayısıyla artış gösteren güvenlik endişelerinden dolayısıyla, hükümetin insani yardım 
aktivitelerine bakış açısını değiştiren kırılma noktasını simgeler. Aynı zaman diliminde Türkiye’nin savaşa 
yönelik politik tavrının değişmesi ve askeri müdahale yoluyla daha aktif bir rol oynamaya başlaması, 
özellikle Türkiye’den Suriye’ye sınır-ötesi yardım sevkiyatı yürüten insani yardım kuruluşları üzerindeki 
baskı ve kontrollerin sıkılaşması için dayanak oluşturur. Bu çalışma vaka incelemesi olarak, bir taraftan 
insani yardım kuruluşlarının faaliyetlerini kısıtlamak, diğer taraftan ise birkaç ayrıcalıklı organizasyonun 
faaliyet alanını genişletmek için hükümetin Suriye ile Güneydoğu sınırını yönetmesini ele alır. Bu çalışma 
Türkiye Hükümeti’nin kurumsal koşullandırma faktörleri ve AB genişleme ölçütleri dolayısıyla tanıtılan 
seçili sınır yönetimi pratiklerinden bazılarını uygulamaya koymayarak gösterdiği eylemlilik yoluyla mutlak 
bir temayül yarattığını tartışır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma Türkiye Hükümeti’nin sağlamlaştırdığı temayül 
üzerinden, öncelikle Suriye ile Güneydoğu sınırı üzerinden yapılan insani yardım akışını düzenlemek ve 
güçleştirmek için kullanarak, Türkiye özelinde insani yardım alanının daralmasına katkıda bulunduğunu 
iddia eder.  
Anahtar kelimeler: STK-hükümet ilişkileri, STK, insani yardım alanı, Güneydoğu Türkiye, Kuzeybatı 
Suriye, göçmen, sınır yönetimi. 
  
 
